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Abstract: The impression of free will is the feeling according to which our choices are neither imposed 
from our inside nor from outside. It is the sense we are the ultimate cause of our acts. In direct opposition 
with the universal determinism, the existence of free will continues to be discussed. In this paper, free will 
is linked to a decisional mechanism: an agent is provided with free will if having performed a predictable 
choice C, it can immediately perform another choice C’ in a random way. The intangible “feeling” of free 
will is replaced by a decision-making process including a predictable decision-making process 
immediately followed by an unpredictable decisional one. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
    Concepts produced by the human mind to characterize its own functioning, such as the 
properties of intelligence, autonomy or free will have a particularly important influence in our 
comprehension of the world. For this reason, they are continuously being revisited by 
philosophy, psychology, neurosciences, cognitive sciences but also computer sciences. In this 
latter area, it is undoubtedly the property of intelligence which has been the most studied in   
Artificial Intelligence, particularly in its most classical branch. Other properties, such as 
autonomy are studied in other fields of computer sciences (Software Agent, Multi-Agent 
Systems or Robotics), each one with their own issues.  
 
    More complex, free will is the property according to which the human being would be the 
first source of his choices. No internal or external force would impose him a choice rather 
than another. In other words, only the individual would be at the origin of his acts. After the 
first characterizations of this property, a question immediately emerged: does free will exist? 
This question has fuelled the philosophical debate for several centuries with no satisfactory 
solution found [1]. Many philosophers, such as Spinoza or Nietzsche, refuted its existence. 
Others, such as Sartre, did not feel that way. Others still have or have had a mitigated opinion. 
Studies of free will carried out by neuroscientists since the end of the last century, such as 
those achieved by B. Libet [2], although informative on certain points, did not give a 
definitive answer either. 
 
    Contrary to intelligence or autonomy, free will has received little attention in the computer 
science domain. A. Krausová and H. Hazan [3] examined the relevance to study free will 
within the General Artificial Intelligence field and answered by the affirmative. J. McCarthy 
[4] and R. Manzotti [5] tackled the free will problem within the classical Artificial 
Intelligence framework, the first via a logical formalization of the property reduced to a 
rational choice, the second by proposing a model sketch. 
 
    The model of free will which is proposed in this paper results from previous work related to 
the autonomy of software agents [6]. That is not completely surprising because these two 
properties have common characteristics, such as the plurality of possibilities and freedom of 
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choice. Free will is considered as a decision-making process structured in three stages, where 
an agent makes a first choice that is immediately called into question by making a second 
choice randomly selected. 
 
    The paper is structured as follows. First, various aspects of free will are sketched, related to 
its nature and problems involved in the implementation of this property inside an artificial 
entity. The third section introduces a class of models called Two-Stage Models of Free Will. 
These models include the creation of the possible choices and the selection of the final choice. 
Sections 4 and 5 present the decision-making process at the heart of the Three-Stage Model of 
Free Will. In conclusion, entities being able to be provided with free will and the needed 
conditions are identified. 
 
 
2.  The Free Will Problem 
 
    Free will is a complex property which creates several questions. The first one is the 
following: how to characterize the property of free will in a precise way? In fact, there is no 
single definition! Indeed, depending on the language, certain formulations of the property 
name will privilege the aspect of choice (in French, libre arbitre), others the aspect of will (in 
English, free will). It would rather be a perception, a sense that our choices belong to us, that 
they are not imposed to us neither from the outside, nor by an interior force which we would 
not control. It is the feeling that we are the main cause of our acts. Free will is mentally 
defined by physical, emotional and intellectual sensations that a person feels, giving birth to a 
specific global “feeling”. In the case of free will, this “sense” is expressed in terms of 
freedom, will and choice, a concise formulation of which could be: my will is free to choose. 
 
    The second question is: why free will is so important? It is possible to identify at least two 
main reasons:  
-  Free will is considered as a specific property to humankind. As our knowledge 
progresses on the animal societies, other properties we believed to be specific to human 
beings appear to be in fact … much less specific! Let us mention for example the capacity to 
use a complex language, to have empathy, to use a technical knowledge in tools construction.  
-  Free will constitutes a social pillar. Because we are provided with free will we are 
morally responsible for our acts and criminally liable before society. Moreover, various 
studies showed that people had a more social behaviour when they believed in the existence 
of free will [7]. Denying the existence of free will is undermining one of the human society 
bases. 
 
    The third question is certainly the most important: does free will actually exist? Serious 
arguments denying its existence were put forward by philosophers and scientists. The threat 
mainly comes from the universal determinism posed as the world’s general functioning 
principle. This is why the contents of this principle must be examined before any study of the 
property of free will. 
 
2.1  Determinism and free will 
 
    The concept of determinism is closely associated with the principle of causality (there 
cannot be an effect without a cause). Determinism is a janusian concept, i.e., a concept which 
has two faces like the Roman god Janus. Indeed, two kinds of determinisms can be 
distinguished: concrete determinisms and speculative determinisms. 
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    Concrete determinisms are determinisms whose existence could be proven in the form of a 
natural law (e.g., the law of gravitation) or explicitly built (e.g., a computer program). 
Speculative determinisms are not supported by any proof of their existence. Only a body of 
facts and correlations suggest that they can exist. Examples of speculative determinisms are 
social determinisms and the most representative of them: the universal determinism. 
 
    The universal determinism is the principle according to which the succession of each event 
in the universe results from the principle of causality, the past and natural laws. According to 
the universal determinism, all is predetermined. That means that each event in the universe is 
given before it occurs. Thus, the existence of free will would be an illusion produced by our 
ignorance of the past and natural laws. On the other hand, the universal determinism is a 
fertile methodological framework because it is an essential engine of the scientific 
investigation. 
 
    As part of the universal determinism, it is important to distinguish the occurrence of an 
event from its predictability. Although an event is predetermined, its predictability may not be 
effective as it appears in chaotic systems. This absence of predictability is often justified as 
being due to a lack of information. This lack of information is also used to deny the existence 
of indeterminism or to interpret chance. As a result, a system can be deterministic and 
predictable, deterministic and not predictable or not deterministic (thus not predictable) if the 
universal determinism is refuted. 
 
    In short, the universal determinism (metaphysical principle) induces a methodology 
(scientific approach), which demonstrates the existence of concrete determinisms (natural 
laws). But it is also a fossilizing metaphysical principle, which denies that our experience as a 
person is the first source of our choices. 
 
    As neither the existence of the universal determinism nor the existence of free will can be 
demonstrated, philosophers have summarized the relationship between these two concepts 
with two points of view: 
-  Incompatibilism: the existence of a deterministic universe is in complete contradiction 
with the existence of free will. Between the two, it is necessary to choose. 
-   Compatibilism: there is no total opposition between a deterministic universe and free 
will. In particular, it is possible to freely act in a deterministic world. 
 
 
2.2  The notion of cause 
 
    Using the law of causality, determinism invokes the concept of cause. But is this notion 
actually easy to handle? 
The concept of cause 
-  Returns to the past, most of the time unknowable: when we have a thought T or we 
have carried out an action A, we cannot specify in an irrefutable manner what all their causes 
were. 
-  Is a multilevel concept: it applies at the same time at the social, psychological, 
biological and physical levels. We generally do not know how these various causal levels 
overlap. 
-  Is protean: in each context where it appears, it presents itself in a different form. 
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- Leads to a regression ad infinitum: the event E is the result of cause C, which is the 
result of cause CC, etc. 
 
    Like determinism, the notion of cause also presents two faces: 
-  It can be an enlightening explanation of a precise experiment. For example, when I 
drop a stone it falls (effect) because the stone is subject to the gravitation law (cause). 
-  It can be unknowable due to an unknown past and composite contents.  
It results that in many cases, the general concept of cause brings more problems than 
solutions. 
 
    In conclusion, the model suggested to interpret and implement the property of free will 
within an artificial entity will replace the problematic concept of cause by the concrete 
concepts of inputs and influences while the couple determinism/indeterminism will be 
replaced by the concepts of predictability/unpredictability. 
 
 
3.  The Two-Stage Models of Free Will 
 
    The characterization of free will in the form of a process including two stages [8] is 
assigned to the American philosopher and psychologist W. James. 
In this model of free will, a process is sequentially executed in two steps: 
-  At the first step, a certain number of possibilities are generated (some of them can be 
randomly created). Several futures are then possible: it is the freedom aspect of the agent 
which is expressed. 
-  In the second stage, one of these possibilities is chosen, choice in which the chance 
does not intervene any more: it is the will part of the agent (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Two-Stage Model of Free Will 
 
    Since then, this model has been taken up directly or indirectly by several philosophers and 
scientists. B. Doyle listed a large number of these interpretations of free will that he classified 
under the generic expression Two-Stage Models of Free Will [9]. 
 
    In Computer Science, J. McCarthy proposed a formalization of the concept which can also 
be considered as a Two-Stage Model of Free Will: 
“We present a theory of simple deterministic free will (SDFW) in a deterministic world. The 
theory splits the mechanism that determines action into two parts. The first part computes 
possible actions and their consequences. Then the second part decides which action is most 
preferable and does it” [4]. 
 
    The important common points to the different Two-Stage Models of Free Will are the 
following: 
-  The generation of the future possible choices and the creation of the selection function 
are parts of the free will process. 
-  There is only one phase of choice that ends the process associated with free will. 
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-  In addition to the concept of will, these models use in the first stage properties difficult 
to characterize with precision, such as intelligence or creativity. 
 
 
4.  From the “Feeling” of Free Will to the “Mechanism” of Free Will 
 
    Free will is a complex property, i.e., it is difficult even impossible to have a thorough 
knowledge of it. It is a property with vague and elastic contours, with their contents changing 
according to the point of view that one can have. It authorizes different interpretations (ex: 
various Two-stage Models of the Free Will), when these interpretations are not contradictory. 
Lastly, for some free will exists, for others it does not exist. 
 
    Tackling free will by considering only the “feeling” associated to it or the “impression” it 
causes poses problems because it requires to use concepts which raise the same type of 
problems of definition and scope (ex: conscience, will, freedom, first cause of an act). 
 
    In order to solve these various problems, the model of free will described in the next section 
is based on the following points: 
-  Conscience and free will are decoupled. That means the implementation of free will in 
an entity does not require that this entity is provided with a brain or an advanced mental 
system. 
-  The choice aspect of free will is privileged over the will aspect. Indeed, the concept of 
choice can be defined with more precision than the concept of will. 
-  The origin and the nature of the causes related to a choice are ignored. The concept of 
cause is replaced by the concepts of inputs and influences. 
-  Free will is considered as a precise decision-making process. Free will is interpreted 
as the possibility to question a first choice by combining in the same decision-making process 
a predictable choice and a random choice. 
 
 
5.  A Three-Stage Model of Free Will 
 
    The suggested characterization of free will is the following: an agent is provided with free 
will if, after having made a predictable choice C, it can immediately make another choice 
C’ in a random way. In other words, the impalpable “feeling” of free will is replaced by a 
two-component decision-making process including a predictable decision-making process 
immediately followed by a unpredictable decision-making one. 
 
5.1  Model 
 
    The Three-Stage Model of free will implements two modules sequentially executed, a 
predictable module and a unpredictable module, driven by causes modelled in the form of 
inputs and influences. 
 
¤ Inputs and Influences 
 
    We will say that a component (or module) has a predictable behaviour if the same inputs 
applied to it always generate the same outputs. 
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The term of input must be understood in its most general signification (internal or external 
conditions, stimuli, states, etc). It was chosen for simplicity reasons: the concept of input has 
the advantage of making the nature of the causes it summarizes transparent. 
 
    A module has an unpredictable behaviour if the same inputs applied to it at two different 
moments can produce different outputs. 
When an input must be represented but with no or little information about it, the term of 
influence will be used. An influence materializes the complex aspect of a property by 
circumscribing its complexity in precise points of the model. 
 
    In the Three-Stage Model of Free Will, influences are only present in the unpredictable 
component (Figure 2). 
Hereafter, the concept of input will be only used to represent well-identified information 
having an effect on a choice module. Otherwise, the term influence will be chosen. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Three-Stage Model of Free Will 
 
¤ The predictable component 
 
    The predictable component provides an artificial entity with a regular behaviour: this 
module can implement a rational choice (e.g., in situation A, my interest is to make choice C) 
or an automatic behaviour (e.g., each time I am in such a situation, I make this choice). In the 
first case, it is a thoughtful behaviour: the situation will be evaluated and the selected choice 
will be determined by taking into account various parameters, such as preferences, 
probabilities of occurrences of events, evaluation of consequences. In the last case, it is a 
constrained behaviour.  
The presence of the predictable module also materializes the coherent behaviour of the agent: 
some sense pre-exists to the selected choice. 
 
    From a formal point of view, the predictable module is characterized by a set of choices Cp 
(1≤p≤N, N>1), a selection function and a set of inputs. From the N possible choices, the 
selection function and the inputs, the predictable module selects a choice Ci. 
Contrary to the various Two-Stage Models of Free Will, processes involved in the 
development of these N choices, the selection function and its inputs are considered being 
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external to the property of free will. This means that it is necessary to have at one’s disposal a 
set of choices, an associated selection function and the values of inputs before free will can 
appear. 
The predictable decision-making process begins with the execution of the selection function. 
It is the first stage of the general process related to free will. 
 
To illustrate the key elements of a predictable module we will use the following example. 
Let us suppose that one task of an agent A is to go to a point P no more than ten kilometres. 
A regular behaviour of A could be: if it rains agent A uses its car, if it does not rain and the sky 
is grey, A uses its bicycle. If the weather is nice, A reaches point P on foot. 
The choice function of the agent is controlled by a unique input: the weather state. The three 
possible choices are: to go by car, to use its bicycle, to walk. 
 
¤ The unpredictable component 
 
    This module includes two elements: 
- A switch, which, either does not interfere on choice Ci resulting from the predictable 
component, or activates an unpredictable choice function. In the first case, Ci is the final 
choice. In the latter case, the final choice could be different. 
- An unpredictable choice function, which carries out a random choice on the N choices 
available during the execution of the predictable component plus an additional choice noted 
C0 called empty choice. This choice means that no choice is performed by the agent. It 
illustrates the situation where there is an inhibition of the choice resulting from the 
predictable component. Consequently, after the activation of the unpredictable component, 
the final choice Cj (0≤j≤N) may differ from choice Ci selected by the predictable component. 
In particular, if j=0 there is inhibition of the choice resulting from the predictable module. 
 
    The following points must also be noted: 
- There is no creation or development of new choices by the unpredictable component. 
- Without context it is difficult to associate a precise meaning to the empty choice C0. 
According to the situations, it can be interpreted in various manners like “no choice must be 
made” or “it is a veto”. 
- The activation details of the switch and random choice function can be partially or 
completely unknown to the agent. This is why their conditions of activation are represented in 
the form of influences. 
 
    Let us assume that in the previous example, the sun is shining. The predictable component 
invites agent A to reach point P on foot. But A can decide for reasons (influences) which are 
partly or completely unknown to it to call this choice into question: the switch is triggered. 
Then, A decides to select by random a choice among four: the three previous choices and the 
choice to remain where it is (C0 choice). This unpredictable choice can be accomplished for 
example by using an appropriate computer program. It should be noted that the quality of the 
random choice function has a secondary importance in the global decision-making process. 
In this precise example, the concept of influence makes it possible to represent an intuition as 
well as a change of mood of A having caused the switch triggering. 
 
¤ A Three-Stage decision-making process 
 
    To sum up, the decision-making process associated to free will is structured by three 
moments (Figure 3): 
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- The moment tD when the execution of the predictable choice function begins. The first 
stage ends with the selection of a choice Ci. 
- The moment tS when the entity decides to put into question the choice Ci. It is the 
second step of the decisional process. 
- The moment tU when the execution of the unpredictable choice function begins, 
leading to the final choice C. 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Temporal pattern of the decision-making process associated to free will 
 
    The agent has expressed its free will when the three moments tD, tS and  tU took place. This 
process will be qualitatively different according to the nature of the agent. If the agent is an 
individual, these three moments will be lived more or less consciously. For an artificial agent, 
the decision-making process associated to free will is simply executed. 
 
5.2  Discussion 
 
¤ Model justification 
 
a) Components articulation 
    Let us justify the role of the model elements and their articulation. 
If the decision-making process associated to free will implemented only the predictable 
choice module, the agent executing this decision-making process would be comparable to a 
classical program like an accounting programme or a flight tickets booking program. 
If the unpredictable component were the only one there, the agent would be stripped of 
rationality and condemned to an erratic functioning. 
Let us suppose that the two modules of choice are reversed. Firstly, subjected to influences, 
the agent performs an unpredictable choice. In a second step, according to influences, the 
switch can give access to the predictable choice module, which according to the inputs, will 
select the rational choice. That means that the trigger of a coherent behaviour of the agent is 
controlled by influences, which is a very unsatisfactory functioning. 
If there were no switch, the two modules would be sequentially executed. In this case, only 
the result of the last executed choice module would be considered. In one case, it boils down 
to always having a rational behaviour, in the other case to systematically exhibiting a random 
behaviour. 
Lastly, the delicate concept of ultimate cause is replaced by the concrete notions of input and 
influence. Their values characterise the current state of the agent. The double advantage of 
the current state notion is that it avoids any reference to the origin of an event while 
synthesizing the agent’s history. 
 
b) The feeling of free will 
    The choice to favour the decision-making aspect of free will rather than the will aspect 
makes it possible to design a model of this complex property. Conversely, the following 
question is worth asking: is this model compatible with the concept of free will? Formulated 
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in another manner, the question becomes: does the proposed mechanism make it possible to 
recompose, at least partially, the feeling of free will? 
From a human point of view, it is undeniable that this three-stage decision-making process 
can give an individual the feeling that he is provided with free will since he has the impression 
of being the source triggering the unpredictable component. However, that does not mean that 
it is the unique situation where an individual can have the feeling to be provided with free 
will. 
 
¤ Comparison between Two-Stage and Three-stage Models 
 
    Several aspects deeply differentiate Two-Stage and Three-Stage Models (Figure 4).  
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Two-Stage vs. Three-Stage Model 
 
    In the Two-Stage Model, the properties of intelligence and creativity intervene in the first 
phase of the model because the creation of the possible choices is part of the process related to 
free will. Free will can thus be seen as a composition of heterogeneous properties which are 
complex to represent. In the Three-Stage Model, choices creation is not part of the free will 
process. This possibilities generation step (Stage 0) takes place before the expression of free 
will. The result is a much finer granularity of the Three-Stage Model than that of the Two-
Stage Model. 
 
    The Two-Stage Model only contains one phase of choice. This choice can be rational or not. 
It expresses the will aspect of the entity. The Three-Stage Model utilizes two consecutive 
choices, a predictable choice followed by a random choice. However, the concept of choice is 
much simpler to implement than the concept of will. 
 
    Lastly, the main weakness of the Two-Stage Model is not discriminating enough. Let us 
take as example a chess program. First, it will analyse the chess position, will generate the 
different possibilities and will choose the best move. The program functioning corresponds 
perfectly to the Two-Stage Model of Free Will. It is then legitimate to conclude that a chess 
program is provided with Free Will. According to the Three-Stage Model, a chess program is 
not provided with Free Will. 
 
¤ Model utilization 
 
a) A critical analysis of a philosophical concept from a computational point of view 
    The human cognitive system produces complex mental concepts, such as the concepts of 
conscience, will, autonomy and free will, partly characterized by other mental concepts with 
vague contents. 
The computational approach of a concept, such as free will imposes a clarification of the 
essential components of the property to obtain an operational model of this concept. This 
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clarification concerns at the same time the choice of the selected elements, their contents and 
their relationship. 
Although this method leads to a simplified representation of the concept, it has the advantage 
of distinguishing with precision what was kept and what was left out of the property. When 
new knowledge is available or when the importance given to some features of the concept is 
changed, it will still be possible to update the model. 
 
    Conversely, reasoning about the model makes it possible on the one hand to identify, 
reduce and isolate the fuzzy areas of the property, and on the other hand to address its 
paradoxical aspects. 
The result is a bidirectional questioning leading to a reciprocal enrichment between concept 
and model. 
 
b) Design of a synthetic property  
    The pursued approach is similar to that of synthetic biology: developing a synthetic 
property starting from data related to a precise philosophical concept. It is an engineering 
approach, which consists in improving the understanding of a property by disassembling and 
rebuilding it in a computational form after identifying its essential aspects. 
It will be possible to put together this synthetic property with other synthetic properties in 
order to create artificial characters. 
 
c) Creation of artificial characters 
    The architecture of the unpredictable component provides a great flexibility to the creator 
of synthetic characters. Indeed, the concepts of influence, switch and unpredictable choice 
can be interpreted in various ways. This interpretative wealth allows the implementation of a 
broad spectrum of software agents. 
For example, the agent’s unpredictable component could be influenced by an emotional 
module. According to the composition of this module and its interconnection with the 
unpredictable component, various levels of steerability of the agent could be simulated. In this 
context, a second aspect, which could also be studied, is the degree of coupling between 
emotions and free will. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
    How to answer the question “Does free will exist?” It depends on the selected meaning of 
this property. 
According to the meaning presented in this paper, free will exists because it is associated with 
a precise decision-making process. But as free will is a complex property with contradictory 
interpretations, it is not possible to give an absolute answer. 
    
    The Three-Stage Model of Free Will is a decision-making process relying on a mechanism 
that is possible to implement in an artificial entity: this model presupposes neither the 
existence of a brain nor a spirit. Consequently, a natural or artificial entity that is able to 
exhibit this decision-making process structured by these three moments will be considered as 
being provided with free will. According to this model, free will is a global property of the 
agent: either the agent possesses this property or it does not have it. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, among the living beings, only humans are able to 
trigger this structured decision-making process and consequently are provided with free will. 
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